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BRIEF REPORT
Mood-congruent bias and attention shifts in the
different episodes of bipolar disorder
Ana C. Garcı´a-Blanco1,2, Manuel Perea1, and Lorenzo Livianos2
1ERI-Lectura, Universitat de Vale`ncia, Valencia, Spain
2Servicio de Psiquiatrı´a, Hospital Universitari i Polite`cnic La Fe, Valencia, Spain
An ‘‘affective’’ go/no-go task was used in the different episodes of bipolar patients (euthymic,
depressed, and manic) to examine (1) the presence of a mood-congruent attentional bias; and (2) the
patients’ ability to inhibit and invert associations between stimuli and responses through blocks. A
group of healthy individuals served as controls. Results revealed a mood-congruent attentional bias:
patients in the manic episode processed positive information faster, whereas those in the depressive
episode processed negative information faster. In contrast, neither euthymic patients nor healthy
individuals showed any mood-congruent biases. Furthermore, there was a shift cost across blocks for
healthy individuals, but not for the patients. This may reflect a general impairment at selecting
relevant information (e.g., in terms of disability to inhibit and invert associations between stimuli and
responses) in bipolar participants, regardless of their episode. This state/trait dissociation in an episodic
and chronic disorder such as bipolar disorder is important for its appropriate characterisation.
Keywords: Bipolar disorder; Affective go/no-go task; Mood congruent biases; Attention shift.
Bipolar disorder is a chronic, severe, and highly
disabling psychiatric disorder that affects approxi-
mately 1% of the world population. These
individuals experience, mania, abnormally ele-
vated or irritable mood states and, in most cases,
depressed mood, abnormally sad or anhedonic
mood states*between these extremes, patients
can experience symptom-free states of euthymia
(see Belmaker, 2004, for a review). Bipolar
disorder is usually characterised in terms of defi-
cits in emotional processing (Harmer, Grayson, &
Goodwin, 2002) and impaired executive function-
ing (Bearden, Hoffman, & Cannon, 2001) that
persist even in euthymic states. It has been
suggested that emotional dysregulation accounts
for these cognitive disturbances by reciprocal
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interactions between cognitive and emotional
networks in the brain (Strakowski, DelBello, &
Adler, 2005). However, studies examining the
cognitive disturbances in bipolar patients in every
different episode (euthymic, depressed, and
manic) are scarce.
In order to analyse the interplay between mood
symptoms and cognition in patients with bipolar
disorder, we administered an affective shifting
task similar to that employed by Murphy et al.
(1999). This is a target-detection task that
requires participants to respond to relevant targets
(e.g., ‘‘happy’’ words) while inhibiting responses to
stimuli of the competing affective category (‘‘sad’’
words). We must bear in mind that this task
can be used not only to measure mood-related
attentional bias (i.e., faster ‘‘happy’’ responses in
patients with mania; faster ‘‘sad’’ responses in
patients with depression), but also to assess the
ability to shift attention. This is so because some
of the blocks are preceded by another block with
the same stimulus-to-response associations (e.g.,
respond to ‘‘happy’’ words in block K1 and
respond to ‘‘happy’’ words in block K), whereas
other blocks are preceded by a block with the
inverse stimulus-to-response associations (e.g.,
respond to ‘‘sad’’ words in block K1 and
respond to ‘‘happy’’ words in block K).
The first goal of the study was to examine
whether patients in the different episodes of
bipolar disorder show a mood-congruent atten-
tional bias (i.e., faster responses to ‘‘happy’’ words
when patients are in a positive mood [mania],
faster responses to ‘‘sad’’ words when patients are
in a negative mood [depression], and no atten-
tional bias when patients have not experienced
major depression or mania for some time
[euthymia]). Murphy et al. (1999) compared
manic patients and individuals with a unipolar
depressive episode. Murphy et al. found that
manic patients were faster to respond to positive
stimuli (see Elliot et al., 2004, for a similar
finding), while unipolar depressed patients
were faster to respond to negative stimuli (see
Erickson et al., 2005, for a similar finding with
unmedicated patients with unipolar depression).
However, Rubinsztein, Michael, Underwood,
Tempest, and Sahakian (2006) failed to find a
mood congruency effect in bipolar depressed
individuals. This latter finding casts some doubts
on the robustness of the mood-congruent bias for
bipolar depression*note that Rubinsztein et al.
acknowledged that some manic symptoms could
have influenced their results. Thus, it is important
to re-examine the existence of a mood-congruent
bias in patients with bipolar disorder.
The second goal of the study was to test the
ability to shift/reverse attention focus in patients
with bipolar disorder. Switching stimulus-to-
response associations typically involves a proces-
sing cost: response times are longer and/or
participants commit more errors in trials that
employ the same stimulus-to-response associa-
tions as in previous trials than in trials that
alternate the associations (e.g., Allport, Styles, &
Hsieh, 1994). For instance, in healthy partici-
pants, Wager, Jonides, Smith, and Nichols (2005)
reported a switching cost in multiple types of
attention shifting tasks. Importantly, previous
studies with bipolar patients have shown that set-
shifting deficits persist across depressed, manic,
and euthymic phases (e.g., using the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test, WCST; see Martı´nez-Ara´n
et al., 2004). Somewhat surprisingly, previous
evidence on shift costs with the affective go/no-
go task is not particularly consistent. Murphy
et al. (1999) failed to find a shift cost in the
response time for healthy individuals (545 vs.
542 ms in shift blocks vs. nonshift blocks respec-
tively), although there were more errors in the
shift blocks than in the non-shift blocks (7.4 vs.
5.7%). For patients with unipolar depression,
Murphy et al. found a significant shifting cost in
the response time (570 vs. 556 ms) and a similar
trend occurred in errors (6.1 vs. 5.3%). For
patients with mania, they found a paradoxical
advantage in the response time of shift blocks over
non-shift blocks (555 vs. 577 ms), although the
opposite trend was found in errors (14.3 vs.
13.1%). In the Erickson et al. (2005) experiment,
both healthy participants and patients with uni-
polar depression made more errors during shift
blocks than nonshift blocks (the error data were
not provided though), while there were no signs
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of a shifting cost in the response time for healthy
participants (503 vs. 506 ms) or patients (518 vs.
512 ms). Finally, Rubinsztein et al. (2006) with
bipolar depressed patients, and Rubinsztein,
Michael, Paykel, and Sahakian (2000) with
euthymic bipolar patients also failed to find a
shifting cost in the response time and in the
errors*they did not provide the mean response
times though. The lack of a shifting cost in
previous studies with the affective go/no-go task
in healthy individuals could be due to the
particularities of the task (i.e., it may not be
sensitive to reversals of attention) or because of
lack of statistical power. Thus, we believe that it is
important to re-examine whether there is a
shifting cost in this task for healthy individuals
(as in other cognitive tasks that require an
attention switch), and whether this shifting cost
is reduced for patients with bipolar disorder.
In sum, the current state of the research ques-
tions seem to be somewhat fragmented because
of potential confoundings like mixed states or
residual symptoms that may have affected pre-
vious studies. In the present study, we overcame
the limitations of previous studies by (1) selecting
patients with the same disorder, and by (2)
comparing groups of these patients who were in
distinct mood states. Therefore, the present
experiment attempted: (1) to better characterise
the interplay between cognition and emotion (in
terms of mood-congruent biases) in individuals
with bipolar disorder; (2) to confirm whether
there is an impaired ability for inhibition and
inversion of stimuli-to-responses associations in
the different episodes of this disorder.
METHOD
Participants
Eighty patients with bipolar disorder who were in
three current mood states, depressive (n22),
euthymic (n28), and manic (n30), partici-
pated in the experiment. They were recruited
from in-patient wards (n32) and from Bipolar
Disorders Unit for out-patients (n58) in the
Psychiatry Department at the Hospital Universi-
tario y Polite´cnico La Fe (Valencia, Spain). Two
patients, both in the depressive episode, refused to
participate. An additional (control) group of 23
healthy individuals were recruited by advertise-
ment in the community. Demographic and clin-
ical details are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Demographic and clinical data from the control group and the patients (in the depressive, euthymic, and manic episodes)
Control (N23) Depressed (N22) Euthymic (N28) Manic (N30) p
% Female 52.2 50.0 32.1 33.3 .31
Age 41.9 (10.7) 44.1 (10.5) 42.7 (8.9) 39.1 (13.7) .42
SASS 43.8 (6.0) 40.8 (6.8) 40.1 (5.3) 39.5 (6.2) .07
WAIS-III
Verbal IQ 108.8 (15.3) 101.0 (8.3) 102.3 (12.3) 101.7 (10.0) .09
Performance IQ 107.0 (14.3) 104.7 (20.1) 99.3 (18.5) 99.6 (19.0) .35
BDI 4.5 (3.2) 23.5 (7.4) 4.7 (4.5) 4.7 (2.9) .00
YMRS * 1.5 (1.7) 1.8 (2.6) 24.9 (4.7) .00
No. of episodes * 6.6 (2.5) 5.8 (5.0) 6.9 (5.6) .65
Age of onset * 36.4 (9.5) 29.1 (8.8) 32.0 (14.1) .08
Medication
Lithium (% patients) * 72.7 85.7 70.0 .34
Antiepileptic (%) * 59.1 50.0 36.7 .26
Antipsychotic (%) * 31.8 39.3 96.7 .00
Antidepressive (%) * 63.6 7.1 6.7 .00
Anxiolytic (%) * 86.4 42.9 90.0 .00
Note: The p-values correspond to the omnibus test for the four [three] groups.
ATTENTIONAL BIASES IN BIPOLAR DISORDER
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This study was approved by the research ethics
committee from the Health Research Institute
‘‘La Fe’’ and all participants gave written informed
consent prior to participation. Patients were
excluded from participation on the basis of the
following criteria: history of neurological illness
or head injury; major medical disorders that are
likely to affect cognition; use of non-psychotropic
medication which could influence cognition (e.g.,
treatment with steroids); concurrent comorbid
substance dependence or other psychiatric diag-
noses based on DSM-IV criteria (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994); and ECT in the
previous three months. Healthy controls were
excluded if there was evidence of psychiatric
history, neurological history, psychoactive sub-
stance abuse, or use of medication that might
potentially influence cognition.
Every participant was given: (1) the Social
Adaptation Self-evaluation Scale (SASS; Bosc,
Dubini, & Polin, 1997) to measure social func-
tioning; and (2) the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale III (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997) to assess
global intellectual functioning and differentiate
between verbal and no-verbal abilities (Verbal IQ
and Performance IQ, respectively). Psychiatrists
in the department were asked to refer suitable
patients for the study. Patients had to fulfil
DSM-IV criteria for bipolar affective disorder
and be manic, depressed or euthymic, according to
experimental group, at the time of screening.
Diagnosis was established using clinical interview
and case note review (every patient was reported
to have a history of at least one manic episode).
DSM-IV diagnoses of all patients were confirmed
by the responsible psychiatrist and by a postgrad-
uate clinical psychology intern. Furthermore, to
ensure the current mood state and the exclusion of
mixed states as well as the absence of affective
symptoms in euthymic patients and control
participants, two clinical scales were applied: (1)
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck,
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), to
participate in the study, the score had to be less
than 9, except in the depressed group, in which
case the score had to be over 18; and (2) the Young
Mania Rating Scale (YMRS; Young, Biggs,
Ziegler, & Meyer, 1978), depressed and euthymic
patients could not obtain a score greater than 6,
while manic patients’ score had to be over 20.
Materials
The stimuli were 90 words with a positive valence
and 90 words with a negative valence taken from
the Spanish adaptation of the Affective Norms for
English Word (ANEW) database (Redondo,
Fraga, Padro´n, & Comesan˜a, 2007). The average
valence for the positive and negative words was
8.1 and 1.5, respectively, on a 9-point Likert scale
(1Very sad; 9Very happy). The presented
stimuli were carefully controlled for arousal as
well as in other potentially relevant lexical/
sublexical factors. Specifically, the two sets of
words were matched for arousal (6.1 vs. 6.3 for
positive and negative words, p.15). We also
controlled for the influence of potentially relevant
lexical/sublexical factors such as written word
frequency (36.6 vs. 28.6 per million words for
positive and negative words, respectively, p.25;
Davis & Perea, 2005), the number of orthographic
‘‘neighbours’’ (1.2 vs. 1.3 for positive and negative
words, p.50), and the number of letters (7.2 vs.
7.1 for positive and negative words, respectively,
p.50). The list of stimuli is available at http://
www.uv.es/mperea/words_ANEW.pdf.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet
room. We used an affective go/no task as
previously described by Murphy et al. (1999)
except that no feedback was provided (note that
error rates were very low in our experiment).
Presentation of stimuli and recording of responses
were controlled by DMDX software (Forster &
Forster, 2003). On each trial, a fixation point ()
was presented for 500 ms in the centre of the
screen. Then, the target word (in lowercase) was
presented centred, in black on a white background
until the participant’s response or until 2,500 ms
had elapsed. The inter-trial interval was 1.5 s. The
task comprises two practice blocks followed by
eight test blocks of 18 stimuli each (nine Positive
GARCI´A-BLANCO, PEREA, LIVIANOS
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[P] words and nine Negative [N] words). Before
each block, either positive or negative words
were specified as targets. Thus, there were two
types of blocks, in the ‘‘positive’’ blocks, partici-
pants were asked to respond only to positive words
and in the ‘‘negative’’ blocks, participants were
asked to respond only to negative words. As in the
Murphy et al. (1999) experiment, targets for the
10 blocks were presented in a PPNNPPNNPP or
NNPPNNPPNN order. Due to this arrangement,
four test blocks are ‘‘shift’’ blocks, where partici-
pants must begin responding to stimuli which
were distractors and cease responding to stimuli
which were targets in the previous block, and four
test blocks are ‘‘non-shift’’ blocks, where partici-
pants must continue responding to stimuli which
were targets and withholding responses to stimuli
which were distractors in the previous block. Each
participant received a different order of trials. The
whole session lasted approximately 1520 minutes.
RESULTS
Response times greater than 1,500 ms (less than
1% of trials) and incorrect responses were ex-
cluded from the latency analysis. The mean
response time, proportion of errors, and propor-
tion of omissions are presented in Table 2.
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) based on the
participants’ mean correct response times, error
rates, and omission rates were conducted based on
a 4 (Group: depressed, euthymic, manic, con-
trol)2 (Target Valence: positive, negative)2
(Shift: shift block, nonshift block). The number of
error and omission rates were very small (.04 and
.03, respectively)*given the small number of
errors and the binomial nature of the categorical
data (i.e., proportion of errors), we employed
linear mixed effects models using the Laplace
approximation to fit the binomial data. The
statistical analyses on the error data failed to
reveal any significant effects (all ps.18) and were
not further considered.
The ANOVA on the latency data revealed a
main effect of Group, F(3, 99)3.15, h2.09,
p.028; this reflected that healthy individuals
responded faster than the patients (784 vs. 882 ms,
respectively), F(1, 99)5.02, h2.07, p.03.
More important, the interaction between Target
Valence and Group was significant, F(3, 99)
4.59, h2.12, p.005. This interaction revealed
that patients in the depressive episode showed
faster response times for negative words than for
positive words (927 vs. 957 ms, respectively),
F(1, 21)4.92, h2.19, p.038, whereas
patients in the manic episode showed faster response
times for positive words than for negative words
Table 2. Mean and standard deviation response times (in ms), error rates, and omission rates for the four groups on the affective shifting
task
Control Depressed Euthymic Manic
Response times
Positive-shift 798 (225) 948 (207) 818 (150) 861 (195)
Positive-nonshift 767 (195) 965 (229) 811 (148) 849 (163)
Negative-shift 804 (238) 905 (195) 844 (145) 892 (170)
Negative-nonshift 766 (181) 948 (218) 831 (156) 905 (206)
Error rates
Positive-shift 0.05 (0.12) 0.02 (0.04) 0.04 (0.05) 0.06 (0.08)
Positive-nonshift 0.03 (0.07) 0.06 (0.12) 0.04 (0.07) 0.04 (0.09)
Negative-shift 0.06 (0.11) 0.04 (0.11) 0.04 (0.07) 0.06 (0.10)
Negative-nonshift 0.03 (0.06) 0.02 (0.05) 0.04 (0.06) 0.04 (0.07)
Omission rates
Positive-shift 0.03 (0.05) 0.04 (0.02) 0.02 (0.05) 0.06 (0.03)
Positive-nonshift 0.00 (0.07) 0.07 (0.10) 0.03 (0.11) 0.02 (0.06)
Negative-shift 0.02 (0.04) 0.04 (0.06) 0.06 (0.10) 0.04 (0.05)
Negative-nonshift 0.01 (0.11) 0.04 (0.05) 0.03 (0.09) 0.03 (0.05)
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(855 vs. 899 ms, respectively), F(1, 29)8.17,
h2.22, p.009. Neither patients in the euthy-
mic phase nor healthy individuals showed a
significant effect of Target Valence*patients in
the euthymic phase: 818 vs. 838 ms for positive
words and negative words, respectively, F(1,
27)2.39, h2.09, p.13; healthy individuals:
783 vs. 785 ms, for positive and negative words,
respectively, FB1.
The interaction between Shift and Group was
significant, F(3, 99)3.39, h2.09, p.02.
This interaction revealed a sizeable 34 ms effect
of shift cost for healthy individuals (shifting block:
801 ms; non-shifting block: 767 ms), F(1, 21)
8.01, h2.27, p.01, but not for the patients*
patients in the manic phase: 877 and 877 ms in
the shift and nonshift blocks, respectively, FB1;
patients in the euthymic phase: 831 and 821 ms,
in the shift and nonshift blocks, respectively, FB
1; patients in the depressive phase: 927 vs. 957 ms
in the shift and nonshift blocks, respectively,
F(1, 21)2.17, h2.09, p.16.
None of the other effects/interactions in the
ANOVA were close to significance, all FsB1.
DISCUSSION
The present affective go/no-go task experiment
has revealed that a mood-congruent attentional
bias occurs in the different episodes of the bipolar
disorder: patients in the manic phase responded
faster to positive information, while patients in
the depressive phase responded faster to negative
information*note that, similarly to healthy con-
trols, patients in the euthymic phase did not show
a mood-congruent bias. Thus, these data extend
the findings of Murphy et al. (1999) within a
single disorder: type I bipolar disorder. Further-
more, the experiment revealed that the ability to
inhibit and invert stimulus-to-responses associa-
tions was impaired in the patients, independently
of their episode. Specifically, we found a signifi-
cant shift cost within healthy controls relative to
patients, but not within the three groups of
bipolar patients. This finding clearly suggests the
existence of a deficit in cognitive flexibility*or
more specifically a deficit in the ability to inhibit
and invert the response across blocks. Finally, the
present experiment is a demonstration that a
shifting cost can be obtained (with healthy
individuals) in an affective go/no-go task (i.e.,
this task can be used in future studies to examine
set-shifting costs).
As in any empirical study, some potential
weaknesses of our study merit comment. First,
all patients with bipolar disorder in the present
study*including those in a euthymic state*were
medicated. This may explain why the response
times of the patients were, on average, greater
than those of the healthy individuals. Nonethe-
less, leaving aside that there is evidence showing
that the mood congruency effect occurs in the
same degree for medicated and unmedicated
patients (Erickson et al., 2005), the differences
in response times between patients and controls
cannot explain alone the mood congruency effect,
or the differential shifting cost between patients
and healthy participants. Second, as a reviewer
suggested, it could be argued that the lack of a
significant shift-cost effect for the patients could
have been due to the fact that the bipolar groups
were somewhat heterogeneous (e.g., in terms of
medication or disorder severity). However, post
hoc analyses on the relationship between the
magnitude of shift cost (and the magnitude of
the mood-congruent effect) and the dose/type of
medication failed to obtain any clear trends*we
acknowledge, however, that one should be cau-
tious at interpreting this null effect. Third, even
though the employed design (which mimicked the
one employed by Murphy et al., 1999) was
powerful enough to detect an interaction between
mood and valence, and between mood and shift, a
more powerful design (e.g., using longer blocks
and a greater emphasis on speed) may be necessary
to capture the subtleties of attentional effects in
bipolar patients. And fourth, in future studies, it
may be important to examine in greater detail the
intricacies of executive functioning involved in
set-shifting with the go/no-go task, and how it
relates with a validated test for detecting executive
dysfunction, such as the WCST. Indeed, there is
empirical evidence that shows mood congruency
GARCI´A-BLANCO, PEREA, LIVIANOS
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effects using mood induction with healthy in-
dividuals (e.g., Roiser et al., 2009). Importantly,
Roiser et al. also found that mood induction
seems to be more effective in individuals with
bipolar disorders than healthy controls. Clearly,
the study of the differences in top-down control of
emotion over attention is an important issue for
further research.
What are the implications of the present
findings? It has been suggested that cognitive
biases play a crucial role in the development,
maintenance, and/or remission of affective psy-
chopathology (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). On
the one hand, recent work on cognitive bias
modification has demonstrated that attentional
biases in depression can be trained and this train-
ing leads to changes in mood and reduces reacti-
vity to stressful events (MacLeod, Rutherford,
Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; Wadlinger
& Isaacowitz, 2008). However, unlike other
affective disorders, research on attention biases
in bipolar disorder remains scarce. On the other
hand, the ability to invert the focus of attention
can be a relevant factor to improve executive
function in bipolar patients. In this sense, Siegle,
Ghinassi, and Thase (2007) have demonstrated
that a neurobehavioural ‘‘cognitive control training’’
reduces both physiological mechanisms underlying
depression and depressive symptomatology. This
is also an important issue for further research with
bipolar patients.
To sum up, the present study demonstrated
that bipolar patients showed different attentional
biases depending on their clinical state, while
specific executive deficits (defined as the ability to
inhibit and invert the response across blocks)
persisted even in asymptomatic patients. This
state/trait dissociation in an episodic and chronic
disorder such as bipolar disorder is important for
an appropriate characterisation of the disorder.
Future efforts should be directed toward increas-
ing the translation of basic research into the clinic
(e.g., via new treatments which focus on executive
function). Our findings provide clear evidence
in favour of a mood-congruent bias for indivi-
duals with bipolar disorder*note that previous
studies did not control for the different affective
symptoms in each episode (e.g., Rubinsztein et al.,
2006). This finding is consistent with the claim
that emotion exerts significant top-down control
over attention. Furthermore, our findings on
shifting costs are consistent with previous evi-
dence with other tasks (e.g., Martı´nez-Ara´n et al.,
2004) and reveal that the disability to shift
stimulus-to-responses associations may represent
an inherent phenotype in mood disorders.
We thank all of the participants without whom
this study would not have been possible.
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